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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.   
Plaintiffs are firefighters who allege that they suffered 
hearing losses caused by the loud noise emitted by a 
manufacturer’s fire sirens. A perfunctory investigation 
conducted by the manufacturer during discovery revealed the 
firefighters’ lawsuit to be clearly time-barred, and also 
revealed that one firefighter had not even suffered hearing loss 
attributable to noise exposure. Eventually, Plaintiffs requested 
the District Court to dismiss the case with prejudice pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). In doing so, the 
District Court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of the 
manufacturer, making an explicit reference to Plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s practice of repeatedly suing the fire siren 
manufacturer in jurisdictions throughout the country in a 
virtually identical fashion.  
On appeal, Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that awarding 
attorneys’ fees and costs is improper under Rule 41(a)(2). 
Plaintiffs’ counsel further challenges the District Court’s 
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consideration of the nationwide scope of counsel’s litigation 
tactics—arguing that, in the Rule 41 context, a district court’s 
consideration of litigation in other jurisdictions constitutes 
reversible error. Plaintiffs’ counsel is wrong on both scores.  
Although attorneys’ fees and costs are typically not 
awarded when a matter is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, 
we conclude that such an award may be granted when 
exceptional circumstances exist. Exceptional circumstances 
include a litigant’s failure to perform a meaningful pre-suit 
investigation, as well as a repeated practice of bringing 
meritless claims and then dismissing them with prejudice after 
both the opposing party and the judicial system have incurred 
substantial costs. Because such exceptional circumstances are 
present in this case, the District Court’s award will be affirmed.  
I. 
 Plaintiffs-Appellants brought suit against Defendant-
Appellee Federal Signal Corporation, alleging that they 
suffered occupational hearing loss due to the “omni-directional 
design” of Federal Signal’s sirens which “unnecessarily 
exposed the firefighters to dangerous levels of sound.” Carroll 
Br. 5. As Plaintiffs’ counsel notes in the first sentence of his 
opening brief’s recitation of the facts, “[t]his action is but one 
of multiple actions, nationwide, involving Plaintiffs’ counsel 
and Federal Signal in which firefighters are seeking 
compensation for hearing loss caused by Federal Signal’s 
mechanical Q fire engine siren and its electronic counter part, 
the e-Q2b.”  Carroll Br. 9. In its opinion awarding attorneys’ 
fees and costs, the District Court similarly took notice of the 
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aggregate nature of counsel’s entrepreneurial litigation 
strategy: 
The history of this case essentially 
mirrors that of many other cases instituted by 
Plaintiffs’ counsel against Federal Signal and 
several of the other original defendants in this 
action. As defense counsel testified . . . since 
sometime in 2011 when current Plaintiffs’ 
counsel became lead counsel, there have been 
some 1300 cases filed in approximately 23 
separate jurisdictions asserting claims for high 
frequency hearing loss which was allegedly 
caused by exposure to defectively designed fire 
sirens. In taking more than 100 plaintiff 
depositions across the country, defense counsel 
learned that the plaintiffs receive a notice at their 
fire departments either on a bulletin board or 
receive a letter through some web-based 
repository of their unions informing them that 
free hearing screening is being offered at the 
union hall. In many instances, those letters and 
notices have been prepared by Plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s law firm. 
Then when the firefighters who decide to 
accept the free hearing test offer go to the union 
hall, they go into a room, sometimes two 
firefighters at a time, where an audiologist puts 
headphones on them, plays pure tones and they 
are either directed to raise their hands or push a 
button when they hear the sounds. Through that 
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testing, an audiometric result is generated. The 
firefighters are not told the results of their tests 
and often do not learn the results of their tests 
until months or sometimes years later, after they 
have become part of a lawsuit. The firefighters 
are not referred to a doctor or advised to wear 
hearing protection. 
Typically, a complaint involving 20–50 
plaintiffs per case is then filed within two or 
three years often almost to the day of the hearing 
screen. Often, the firefighters do not learn that 
they are plaintiffs in an action until after suit is 
filed and they receive something in the mail from 
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm. In one case, a 
Pittsburgh firefighter discovered he had been 
named as a plaintiff when he heard a television 
news story about the lawsuit. Frequently the first 
contact a firefighter plaintiff has with someone 
from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm occurs at or 
around the time of their deposition. Although a 
number of these cases have gone to trial with 
some resulting in verdicts for the plaintiffs and 
some resulting in defense verdicts, there have 
been other instances in which Federal Signal’s 
attorneys have completed discovery in a matter 
and sometimes even taken a case to trial when 
Plaintiffs’ counsel dismisses the case. 
JA 13–14 (District Court opinion). Although counsel objects 
to this portion of the District Court’s opinion as having 
inappropriately considered extra-jurisdictional litigation, the 
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thrust of the opinion was more concerned with the history of 
the specific case before the District Court. A summary of that 
history follows.  
 In January of 2015, Plaintiffs brought suit against 
multiple defendants in the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas. Although Federal Signal is now the only remaining 
defendant in this matter, a previous co-defendant removed this 
civil action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in February 
of 2015.1 Federal Signal conducted depositions of Plaintiffs 
from late March to early April of 2015. These depositions 
revealed two fatal flaws in Plaintiffs’ case. 
 First, deposition testimony revealed all Plaintiffs’ 
claims to be clearly time-barred. JA 15. As the District Court 
explained: 
[T]his case is somewhat unique in that 
[Plaintiffs’] Fire Department has, since the 
1990’s, conducted routine annual audiological 
screenings of all of its firefighters as part of their 
required annual physical examinations. As a 
result, nearly all of the plaintiffs in this suit had 
been advised many years earlier that they had 
hearing loss that was very probably caused by the 
                                              
1 In addition to suing Federal Signal, the Plaintiffs sued 
three other manufacturers: E-One, Incorporated, Pierce 
Manufacturing, Inc., and Seagrave Fire Apparatus, LLC. 
JA 64–65. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed with 
prejudice all of their claims against those three companies.  
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loud noises to which they were exposed on the 
job and that they should be wearing hearing 
protection. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ claims were 
obviously time-barred when they filed in or 
around January 2015. 
JA 14–15 (footnote omitted). The second fatal flaw uncovered 
during discovery was that one of the Plaintiffs, Christopher 
Turner, did not suffer from hearing loss attributable to noise 
exposure.2 JA 15 n.1. As the District Court astutely pointed out, 
“had Plaintiffs’ counsel spoken with the individual plaintiffs or 
conducted any other type of investigation prior to commencing 
this litigation, [counsel] would have learned these facts.” JA 
15. 
 After discovery revealed these flaws in Plaintiffs’ case, 
Federal Signal wrote to Plaintiffs’ counsel on May 10, 2016, 
demanding voluntary dismissal with prejudice and informing 
Plaintiffs’ counsel that Federal Signal would be seeking fees 
and costs attributable to defending against Turner’s baseless 
claims. JA 271–73. Plaintiffs’ counsel countered with an offer 
to voluntarily dismiss all of the claims with prejudice so long 
as Federal Signal agreed to waive costs for all plaintiffs except 
for Turner. On May 23, 2016, Federal Signal rejected that 
offer, countering with a proposal to stipulate to a voluntary 
dismissal upon repayment of the then still nominal costs 
attributable to litigating the meritless matter, as well as a 
                                              
2 Although Turner’s audiograms revealed that he suffered 
from hearing loss, it was not hearing loss attributable to 
loud noises.  
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payment of fees associated with defending against Turner’s 
allegations.3 JA 274–75. In its March 23rd letter, Federal Signal 
explained that it had rejected counsel’s offer, choosing instead 
to counter-offer, because of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s “failure to 
conduct any diligence regarding the legal viability of the 
individual cases or to otherwise properly screen in the first 
place.” JA 274. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel ignored Federal Signal’s counter-
offer, and on May 31, 2016—without seeking leave of the 
District Court—filed a “Notice of Dismissal,” asking the Clerk 
of Court to “mark the claims of all Plaintiffs as being dismissed 
without prejudice to all parties in this action.”  JA 77 (emphasis 
added). As we explain in greater detail below, this “Notice of 
Dismissal” was improper under Rule 41.4 By that point, 
                                              
3 Federal Signal’s counter-offer sought $7,871.10 in fees 
and costs, or approximately three percent of the 
$255,646.95 that it ultimately requested the District Court 
to award. The District Court awarded $127,823.47, which 
was half of that ultimate request. Neither side challenges 
the amount of the District Court’s award on appeal. JA 4, 
18. 
4 While Rule 41(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to voluntarily 
dismiss a claim with a court’s order, Rule 41(a)(1) permits 
a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a claim without a court 
order if the plaintiff does so “before the opposing party 
serves either an answer or a motion for summary 
judgment,” or with a “stipulation of dismissal signed by 
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discovery had already closed, all of the defendants had 
answered the complaint, and the parties had not agreed to a 
stipulation of dismissal. 
One month later, on June 30, 2016, Federal Signal filed 
a motion seeking fees and costs, and further challenging 
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability to “voluntarily” dismiss the 
firefighters’ claims without prejudice. JA 79–89. On July 8, 
Plaintiffs’ counsel opposed Federal Signal’s request for fees 
and costs, but was by that point agreeable to dismissing the 
matter with prejudice. JA 7, 447–50. Curiously, on July 21, the 
Clerk of Court entered an order dismissing the action “with 
prejudice, pursuant to agreement of counsel without costs.” JA 
459. It is unclear who informed the Clerk of Court that the 
parties had “agreed” to a dismissal without costs, as Federal 
Signal had repeatedly requested attorneys’ fees and costs in 
writing, and had already filed the instant action to collect those 
fees and costs. The District Court vacated the Clerk’s order, as 
erroneously entered, on July 27, 2016. 
 On September 6, 2016, the District Court issued a 
memorandum concluding that, because the defendants had 
already filed answers to the complaint prior to Plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s May 31 “Notice of Dismissal,” the firefighters “no 
longer had the option to voluntarily dismiss” their claims 
without the District Court’s permission. JA 464. The District 
Court explained that Plaintiffs had therefore “clearly erred in 
unilaterally filing a notice addressed to the Clerk of Court 
                                              
all parties who have appeared.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(i–ii). 
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asking that their claims be marked as being dismissed without 
prejudice.” JA 464. Nonetheless, the District Court explained 
further that the “facts certainly militate in favor” of granting 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). JA 
467. That Rule permits a court to dismiss an action “at the 
plaintiff’s request . . . on terms that the court considers proper.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). In order to develop the proper terms 
for dismissal, the District Court stayed Federal Signal’s motion 
for fees and costs pending an evidentiary hearing. JA 467–70. 
Hearings were held on both November 1, 2016 and December 
20, 2016. JA 532, 656. A defense attorney for Federal Signal 
testified; Plaintiffs’ counsel chose not to offer any witnesses.   
 On April 25, 2017, the District Court granted Federal 
Signal’s Motion for Fees and Costs. JA 5. The memorandum 
accompanying that order set out the procedural history of the 
case, including the District Court’s determination in its 
September 6, 2016 decision that Plaintiffs had erred in filing 
the notice of dismissal without prejudice. The District Court 
additionally explained that “Federal Signal had adduced 
sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs’ counsel had failed to 
undertake any pre-suit investigation into the viability of the 
claims asserted.” JA 8.   
The District Court then recognized the “general rule” 
that attorneys’ fees are typically not available “when a plaintiff 
dismisses an action with prejudice absent exceptional 
circumstances,” JA 10, and further explained that such 
“circumstances include an abuse of the judicial process or bad 
faith conduct.” Id. The Court concluded that “there is no 
question that Rule 41 authorizes a court to award costs and 
attorneys’ fees as a condition of voluntary dismissal and 
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numerous courts have done so where a voluntary dismissal has 
been granted.” JA 11. 
Recognizing that any fee award must be compensatory 
rather than punitive, and mindful that the dismissal was with 
prejudice, the District Court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs 
in the amount of $127,823.47, only half of the amount sought 
by Federal Signal. JA 16–18. The Court directed that the action 
“shall be dismissed with prejudice.” JA 18–19. This timely 
appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441. We have final order jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a Rule 41(a)(2) order 
granting an award of attorneys’ fees and costs for an abuse of 
discretion. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio & 
Mach. Workers of Am., 194 F.2d 770, 771 (3d Cir. 1952). We 
review de novo any questions of law that underlie a district 
court’s Rule 41(a)(2) analysis. See AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 
F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1997). 
III. 
 Though Plaintiffs’ counsel originally intended his May 
31, 2016 “Notice of Dismissal” to be filed pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1),  he now concedes “this was 
improper and the action should have been dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 41(a)(2).” Carroll Br. 22. We agree.  
Rule 41(a) provides: 
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(a) Voluntary Dismissal. 
(1) By the Plaintiff. 
(A) Without a Court Order. Subject 
to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 
and any applicable federal statute, the 
plaintiff may dismiss an action 
without a court order by filing: 
(i) a notice of dismissal before the 
opposing party serves either an 
answer or a motion for summary 
judgment; or 
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal 
signed by all parties who have 
appeared. 
(B) Effect. Unless the notice or 
stipulation states otherwise, the 
dismissal is without prejudice. But if 
the plaintiff previously dismissed any 
federal- or state-court action based on 
or including the same claim, a notice 
of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication on the merits. 
(2) By Court Order; Effect. Except as 
provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may 
be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only 
by court order, on terms that the court 
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considers proper. If a defendant has 
pleaded a counterclaim before being 
served with the plaintiff’s motion to 
dismiss, the action may be dismissed over 
the defendant’s objection only if the 
counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication. Unless the 
order states otherwise, a dismissal under 
this paragraph (2) is without prejudice. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41.5 Because Federal Signal had already filed 
its answer prior to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s May 31, 2016 “Notice 
to Dismiss,” and had not stipulated to dismissal, Rule 41(a)(1) 
was not applicable. This is because Rule 41(a)(1) requires that 
                                              
5 The current text of Rule 41(a)(2) was the product of the 
2007 amendments to the civil rules. The predecessor to 
this rule provided: “An action shall not be dismissed at the 
plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” This 
change was considered non-substantive. See 9 Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 2361 (3d ed. 2008) (“Federal Rule 41 has 
been amended seven times since it originally was 
promulgated in 1938. The amendments, however, have 
been substantively insignificant. It is doubtful if a single 
case would have been decided differently if the rule stood 
as it did in 1938 . . .”). Accordingly, we consider the case 
law pertaining to the earlier version of this Rule to be 
instructive.  
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such a filing be submitted either “before the opposing party 
serves . . . an answer,” Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), or be filed along 
with “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared.” Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). In light of Rule 41(a)(1)’s 
inapplicability, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s “Notice to Dismiss” 
properly falls within the scope of Rule 41(a)(2), which allows 
an action to be “dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by 
court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” The 
District Court therefore properly considered dismissal under 
Rule 41(a)(2) rather than Rule 41(a)(1). 
IV. 
 Under Rule 41(a)(2), the District Court was permitted 
to dismiss the case “on terms that the court considers proper.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). In exercising that broad grant of 
discretion, the District Court concluded that its terms would 
include an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. As noted above, 
in coming to this conclusion the District Court recognized the 
“general rule [that] defendants are not permitted to recover fees 
when a plaintiff dismisses an action with prejudice absent 
exceptional circumstances.” JA 10. This general rule 
acknowledges that, in the ordinary case, dismissal with 
prejudice protects a defendant from otherwise repetitive 
litigation, whereas dismissal without prejudice leaves a 
defendant at risk of re-litigating dismissed issues. But this 
general rule was not applied to the case at hand because, as the 
District Court put it, “this case is unusual and it therefore calls 
for an unusual solution.” JA 18. 
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A. 
This Court has yet to provide guidance as to when 
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs is appropriate under a Rule 
41(a)(2) dismissal with prejudice. We have, however, 
acknowledged a district court’s ability to attach conditions to 
Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal orders. In Raab v. City of Ocean City, 
we considered a district court’s ability to attach two terms to 
its order of dismissal: an explicit incorporation of a settlement 
agreement between the parties, and the requirement that the 
district court retain jurisdiction over that agreement. Raab v. 
City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 2016). An 
appellee in that case argued that the district court’s sua sponte 
retention of jurisdiction was invalid because the parties did not 
consent to such a retention of jurisdiction over their agreement. 
In addressing that argument we noted a distinction between 
Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule 41(a)(2). With the former, the parties’ 
consent to a district court’s retention of jurisdiction is typically 
sought; with the latter, “the Supreme Court has indicated [that] 
district courts may retain jurisdiction without the parties’ 
consent.” Id. at 296. 
In Raab, we referred to Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Insurance Co. of America, in which the Supreme Court 
explained that “[w]hen the dismissal is pursuant to [Rule] 
41(a)(2) . . . the parties’ compliance with the terms of the 
settlement contract (or the court’s ‘retention of jurisdiction’ 
over the settlement contract) may, in the court’s discretion, be 
one of the terms set forth in the order.” Kokkonen v. Guardian 
Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). The 
Raab panel declared that “Kokkonen made clear that, for court 
dismissals made pursuant to [Rule] 41(a)(2), a district court 
 17 
 
may, in its discretion, ‘attach conditions to the parties’ 
stipulation of dismissal’—including the retention of 
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.” Raab, 833 F.3d at 
296 (citation omitted). 
Other courts have more directly addressed a district 
court’s ability to award attorneys’ fees and costs as a proper 
term of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2).6 In doing so, courts have 
often recognized the same general principle that the District 
Court recognized in this case: although attorneys’ fees and 
                                              
6 One persuasive example comes from the Supreme Court 
of the State of Hawai‘i, where the Court held that, under 
Hawai‘i District Rules of Civil Procedure (“HDCRCP”) 
Rule 41(a)(2), “a trial court has discretion to impose terms 
and conditions, including attorney’s fees and costs” as 
long as the court provides the plaintiff with the opportunity 
to either withdraw the request for dismissal or accept the 
court’s terms. Tagupa v. VIPDesk, 353 P.3d 1010, 1020 
(Haw. 2015). The Tagupa Court noted that “[w]hile this 
court has not previously addressed whether attorney’s fees 
may be imposed as a term or condition of voluntary 
dismissal under HDCRCP Rule 41(a)(2), there is abundant 
authority interpreting comparable provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” and since HDCRCP 
Rule 41(a)(2) was “essentially identical” to FRCP Rule 
41(a)(2), “cases interpreting and applying HRCP Rule 
41(a)(2) and FRCP Rule 41(a)(2) may be consulted for 
guidance in interpreting HDCRCP Rule 41(a)(2).” 
Tagupa, 353 P.3d at 1018. 
 18 
 
costs may be frequently awarded when dismissal is without 
prejudice, attorneys’ fees and costs are not typically 
appropriate when dismissal is with prejudice. Importantly, 
however, these cases do not hold that fees can never be 
awarded in light of extraordinary circumstances. Indeed, courts 
have held that awarding attorneys’ fees and costs as a term of 
a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal may be appropriate where such fees 
and costs were unnecessarily incurred.7  
One case applying the general rule against awarding 
attorneys’ fees and costs when dismissal is with prejudice 
comes from the Sixth Circuit. In Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d 830 
(6th Cir. 1965), the Court explained that “cases permit 
allowance of attorney’s fees against the dismissing party where 
the action is dismissed without prejudice.” Smoot, 353 F.2d at 
833. This was contrasted against “dismissal with prejudice,” 
which “finally terminates the cause” meaning that “the 
defendant cannot be made to defend again.” Id. After noting 
this distinction, the Sixth Circuit cast doubt on the 
appropriateness of awarding attorneys’ fees and costs when 
                                              
7 For example, in GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Insurance 
Co., 665 F.2d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote 
omitted), the D.C. Circuit explained that the purpose of the 
“terms and conditions” clause in an earlier version of Rule 
41(a)(2) was “to protect a defendant from any prejudice or 
inconvenience that may result from a plaintiff’s voluntary 
dismissal. Attorneys’ fees and costs are commonly 
awarded as one such ‘term and condition’ for a voluntary 
dismissal, for those costs were undertaken unnecessarily 
in such a case.” 
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dismissal was with prejudice, citing to a district court’s holding 
“that attorney’s fees are not proper where the dismissal is with 
prejudice.” Id. (citing Lawrence v. Fuld, 32 F.R.D. 329 (D. Md. 
1963)).  
The Seventh Circuit has similarly questioned the 
appropriateness of awarding attorneys’ fees and costs when 
dismissal is with prejudice. In Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 769 
(7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit considered a challenge to 
an award of attorneys’ fees granted in response to an oral Rule 
41(a)(2) motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The 
Court noted that “[f]ees are not awarded when a plaintiff 
obtains a dismissal with prejudice because the ‘defendant 
cannot be made to defend again.’” Cauley, 754 F.2d at 772 
(quoting Smoot, 353 F.2d at 833). This was to be distinguished 
from “the case of a dismissal without prejudice” since there 
“the defendant may have to defend again at a later time and 
incur duplicative legal expenses.” Id. Applying “these general 
standards” to the fees awarded in the motion for voluntary 
dismissal without prejudice then before the Court, the Seventh 
Circuit explained that it would “affirm the fees award unless 
the award constitutes an abuse of discretion by the district 
court.” Id. But because the “request for attorney’s fees lacked 
sufficient detail to permit the district court to determine a 
reasonable award,” the Seventh Circuit remanded the case so 
that the district court could “receive additional evidence and to 
reconsider the fees issue.”8 Id.  
                                              
8 In what now seems to be an almost quaint reference, the 
Seventh Circuit also “question[ed] . . . whether a lawyer 
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While Smoot and Cauley illustrate a general hesitation 
to award attorneys’ fees and costs when dismissal is with 
prejudice, we read these cases as simply stating a general rule. 
Indeed, this general rule is one that courts in this circuit must 
similarly adhere to. But our recognition of this general rule 
does not end our analysis. As with many areas of the law, 
limited and principled exceptions to general rules often 
develop over time. 
Other circuits have distinguished Rule 41(a)(2) 
dismissals with and without prejudice in a more textured 
manner. These courts have explained that, although a dismissal 
with prejudice does not ordinarily warrant an award of fees and 
costs, there are times when such an award will be appropriate. 
For example, in Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 
1985), the Second Circuit explained that although an award of 
attorneys’ fees and costs is not ordinarily paired with a 
dismissal with prejudice, the Second Circuit’s “reading of Rule 
41(a)(2) does not altogether foreclose fees in the event of a 
dismissal with prejudice.” Id. at 134. Specifically, “such an 
award might be one of the appropriate ‘terms or conditions’ 
authorized by Rule 41(a)(2), e.g., if a litigant had made a 
practice of repeatedly bringing potentially meritorious claims 
and then dismissing them with prejudice after inflicting 
substantial litigation costs on the opposing party and the 
judicial system.” Id. at 134–35. Because the Second Circuit 
concluded that such circumstances were not present in the case 
                                              
less than three years out of law school was justified in 
charging $100 per hour in 1975.” Cauley, 754 F.2d at 772. 
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before it, the Court reversed the district court’s award. Id. at 
135. 
Similarly, in AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, the Tenth Circuit 
considered whether a district court had “abuse[d] its discretion 
in declining to award attorneys’ fees as a ‘term or condition’ 
under Rule 41(a)(2) when a plaintiff dismisse[d] its action with 
prejudice.” AeroTech, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1997). 
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that it 
“continue[d] to adhere to the rule that a defendant may not 
recover attorneys’ fees when a plaintiff dismisses an action 
with prejudice absent exceptional circumstances.” Id. That 
court went on to clarify that “[o]f course, when a litigant makes 
a repeated practice of bringing claims and then dismissing 
them with prejudice after inflicting substantial litigation costs 
on the opposing party and the judicial system, attorneys’ fees 
might be appropriate.” Id. Because the Tenth Circuit found that 
“such an exceptional circumstance [wa]s not present,” the 
Court “conclude[d] that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying attorneys’ fees under Rule 41(a)(2).”9 Id. 
                                              
9 The Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed its rationale in AeroTech. 
Steinert v. Winn Grp., Inc., 440 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 
2006) (“But if the dismissal is with prejudice, attorney fees 
may be imposed under Rule 41(a)(2) only in ‘exceptional 
circumstances.’ AeroTech, 110 F.3d at 1528. An example of 
such a circumstance is ‘when a litigant makes a repeated 
practice of bringing claims and then dismissing them with 
prejudice after inflicting substantial litigation costs on the 
opposing party and the judicial system.’” (citation omitted)); 
Ryan v. Donley, 511 F. App’x 687, 692 (10th Cir. 2013) 
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 We conclude, in step with our colleagues on the Second 
and Tenth Circuits, that although attorneys’ fees and costs 
should not typically be awarded in a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal 
with prejudice, exceptional circumstances may sometimes 
warrant granting such an award. The facts of the instant case 
exemplify such exceptional circumstances: a litigant’s failure 
to perform a meaningful pre-suit investigation, coupled with a 
litigant’s repeated practice of bringing claims and dismissing 
them with prejudice after inflicting substantial costs on the 
opposing party and the judicial system. 
B. 
 As to a litigant’s failure to perform a meaningful pre-
suit investigation, we start by noting that this standard 
constitutes a high bar for litigants to meet. The run-of-the-mill 
case will not meet such a bar, even when a jurist believes that 
a more thorough pre-suit investigation should have been 
conducted. The instant case, however, provides an example of 
the very sort of exceptional circumstances warranting an award 
of attorneys’ fees and costs, despite a dismissal with prejudice.  
We turn first to the circumstances surrounding Turner, 
a plaintiff who did not even suffer the type of hearing loss 
alleged in the underlying lawsuit. Had Plaintiffs’ counsel even 
looked at Turner’s audiograms, he would have recognized the 
                                              
(unpublished) (“Although AeroTech acknowledged that a fee 
award ‘might be appropriate’ if there were exceptional 
circumstances, this case does not present any such exceptional 
circumstances.”) (internal citation omitted); see also JA 10–11 
(citing Steinert, 440 F.3d at 1222). 
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deficiency in the claim. JA 260 (“None of [Turner’s] hearing 
tests, including the November 28, 2011 hearing test sponsored 
by [Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm] shows any features 
consistent with noise-induced hearing loss.”). Plaintiffs’ 
counsel conceded this point at oral argument. Oral Argument 
Transcript at 12–13 (“Judge . . . you can have high frequency 
hearing loss that an expert would say is not noise related . . . 
but caused by conduction . . . [as] somebody who looks at 
audiograms I will tell you that [Turner’s hearing loss] is most 
likely caused by conductive hearing loss.”); id. at 12 
(“[C]learly [Turner’s] audiogram was more of a conductive 
nature.”).  
When Federal Signal wrote to Plaintiffs’ counsel on 
May 10, 2016, demanding voluntary dismissal with prejudice, 
Federal Signal alerted Plaintiffs’ counsel to the fact that 
Turner’s audiograms revealed that he “does not have noise-
induced hearing loss.” JA 273. Federal Signal further wrote 
that, had Plaintiffs’ counsel “reviewed Turner’s audiogram at 
any point before filing this lawsuit, you would have realized 
this.” JA 273. Moreover, Federal Signal’s letter memorializes 
a conversation that had occurred between opposing counsel 
“[o]n the morning of March 23, 2016, while there was still 
sufficient time to cancel” Turner’s deposition. JA 273. In that 
conversation, Federal Signal explained to Plaintiffs’ counsel 
that if he “declined to dismiss Turner and instead forced 
[Federal Signal] to go forward with his deposition, [Federal 
Signal] would seek our fees and costs.” JA 273. Plaintiffs’ 
counsel, fully aware that Turner had no viable claim, still 
forced Federal Signal to go forward with depositions.  
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But though the circumstances surrounding Turner 
provide the most egregious evidence of counsel’s failure to 
conduct a meaningful pre-suit investigation, it is not the only 
evidence supporting an extraordinary circumstances 
determination. As counsel for Federal Signal noted in one of 
the evidentiary hearings conducted by the District Court, 
depositions revealed that many of the plaintiffs freely 
acknowledged that they had participated in annual hearing 
checks for many years before the complaint was filed, during 
which they were notified that loud noise likely caused their 
hearing loss. JA 554. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not take the 
opportunity to put on any evidence to refute this testimony 
during either of the two evidentiary hearings conducted by the 
District Court. JA 15 (referring to the evidence which was 
“undisputed and wholly uncontradicted by the plaintiffs”). Nor 
does it appear counsel could have done so, since even a brief 
discussion with these clients in advance of filing would have 
alerted counsel to the reality that Plaintiffs knew about their 
hearing loss for multiple years in advance, making their claims 
obviously time-barred.10 
                                              
10 Plaintiffs’ complaint sought to hold Defendants either 
strictly or negligently liable for damages allegedly caused by 
Defendants’ products. Under Pennsylvania law, Plaintiffs 
would have ordinarily been required to commence their actions 
within two years of their injury. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 
5521(b), 5524(2). Pennsylvania, however, recognizes the 
“discovery rule,” which tolls the running of a statute of 
limitations for “that period of time during which a party who 
has not suffered an immediately ascertainable injury is 
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One plaintiff, for example, confirmed that he had been 
aware of his hearing results since 2011, explaining that his 
results were “[n]ot good,” JA 210, and that he had been 
referred to a specialist because he was losing his hearing. JA 
211. Similarly, Gerald Carroll confirmed that he had been told 
of his hearing loss since at least 2011. JA 231–32. Indeed, 
Carroll learned that his hearing loss was likely attributable to 
his job as a firefighter no later than 2011. JA 232. The 
depositions of other plaintiffs revealed similar issues.11 
                                              
reasonably unaware he has been injured, so that he has 
essentially the same rights as those who have suffered such an 
injury.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005). In light 
of the discovery rule, Plaintiffs might have been excused from 
commencing their claims if they had not learned of their injury 
until much later. But as the District Court noted, since “nearly 
all of the plaintiffs in this suit had been advised many years 
earlier that they had hearing loss that was very probably caused 
by the loud noises to which they were exposed on the job and 
that they should be wearing hearing protection . . . Plaintiffs’ 
claims were obviously time-barred when they were filed in or 
around January, 2015.” JA 14–15 (footnote omitted). 
Plaintiffs’ counsel concedes that his clients’ claims were time-
barred. Carroll Br. 31 (“Clearly Dr. Malomo’s testimony was 
enough to lead the trier of fact [to find] that both prongs of the 
discovery rule test were satisfied and that action was no longer 
tenable.”). 
11 For example, one plaintiff noticed his hearing loss when he 
was riding ambulances in either 1975 or 1976. JA 168. Another 
plaintiff acknowledged that his ringing in the ears started 
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It is unremarkable that Plaintiffs did not exhibit an 
understanding of Pennsylvania tort law sufficient to permit 
them to conclude that their claims were time-barred. Any 
plaintiff would have likely learned of that reality only after 
discussing the matter with counsel. In stark contrast to the 
routine discussions that an attorney should have with a client 
before filing suit, Carroll clarified in his deposition that he 
learned of his participation in this lawsuit only after he received 
an e-mail from Plaintiffs’ law firm. JA 227. Such an 
uninformed rush to the courthouse skirts the norms of proper 
legal practice in pursuit of the fruits of aggregation. It should 
not be condoned.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that he was not put on notice 
of the time-barred nature of his clients’ claims until the 
deposition of Dr. Malomo, a medical director of the police and 
fire clinic that provided annual hearing tests to Plaintiffs. 
Carroll Br. 6; JA 234–37. But even if true, it only provides 
further evidence of counsel’s failure to conduct a meaningful 
pre-suit investigation. Rather than wait for the deposition of 
Dr. Malomo, counsel could simply have asked his clients 
during a routine interview when they had first discovered that 
they were suffering from hearing loss attributable to their jobs 
as firefighters. By failing to do so, counsel shifted the costs of 
a pre-suit investigation onto Federal Signal by requiring 
Federal Signal to take depositions in order to ask Plaintiffs the 
                                              
within the last ten years, and that he had been told at his yearly 
physicals over those years that he had failed his hearing tests. 
JA 183–85.  
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very questions that their own lawyer should have asked prior 
to filing suit.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that the District Court 
inappropriately took him “to task for allegedly not conducting 
a proper investigation even though all parties recognize that 
[Plaintiffs] are subject to a hearing program that has no equal 
in any of the fire departments from which these [nationwide] 
claims have arisen.” Carroll Br. 30. Not so. The fact that 
Plaintiffs’ fire department conducts annual hearing 
examinations, unlike other departments throughout the 
country, does not excuse counsel from speaking to his own 
clients before filing a lawsuit on their behalf. It highlights the 
importance that counsel treat each individual case in this 
aggregate litigation as just that, its own individual case. Neither 
this panel nor the District Court has pronounced judgment as 
to whether Plaintiffs’ counsel exhibited the characteristics of a 
“good” or “bad” lawyer during this litigation. What we can say, 
however, is that this case is an example of some of the excesses 
of modern mass tort litigation—when attention to an individual 
case is sacrificed for the sake of pursuing mass filings. In 
granting an award, the District Court appropriately offset some 
of the costs incurred by Defendants which resulted from 
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to pay attention to detail. 
C. 
In awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, the District 
Court’s analysis did more than take account of the lack of 
meaningful pre-suit preparation. Specifically, the District 
Court considered circumstances that extended beyond the 
geographic boundaries that make up the Eastern District of 
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Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs’ counsel makes much of this portion 
of the District Court’s opinion, going as far as stating that the 
District Court “appoint[ed] itself the policeman of this 
nationwide litigation” by “unilaterally usurp[ing] the powers 
of the other courts.” Carroll Br. 25–26. Putting aside counsel’s 
overheated rhetoric, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion when it explicitly considered the entirety 
of this “nationwide litigation.” 
Far from seeking “any excuse to impose[] what would 
be the equivalent of sanctions on Plaintiff[s’] counsel,” Carroll 
Br. 25, the District Court properly took notice of how the case 
before it fit within the larger network of cases brought by 
Plaintiffs’ counsel throughout the country. In doing so, the 
District Court acted in accord with the reasoning of the Second 
Circuit in Colombrito, and the Tenth Circuit in AeroTech—
courts that have explicitly made clear that attorneys’ fees and 
costs may be appropriately awarded, despite dismissal with 
prejudice, in those rare instances when a litigant repeatedly 
brings and dismisses claims with prejudice after inflicting 
substantial costs on the opposing party and the judicial 
system.12 The District Court concluded that that exception 
                                              
12 Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 134–35 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“Conceivably such an award might be one of the appropriate 
‘terms or conditions’ authorized by Rule 41(a)(2), e.g., if a 
litigant had made a practice of repeatedly bringing potentially 
meritorious claims and then dismissing them with prejudice 
after inflicting substantial litigation costs on the opposing party 
and the judicial system.”); AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 
1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Of course, when a litigant makes 
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should apply to the case at hand, and we conclude that the 
Court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See, e.g., JA 14 
(referring to “instances in which Federal Signal’s attorneys 
have completed discovery in a matter and sometimes even 
taken a case to trial when Plaintiffs’ counsel dismisses the 
case.”). 
Plaintiffs’ counsel attempts to limit this exception to the 
general rule against awarding attorneys’ fees and costs. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that a district court 
should only be permitted to inquire into abusive litigation 
practices that occur within the district court’s own jurisdiction. 
See Carroll Br. 24. To the extent that our sister circuits were 
unclear on this point, we take this opportunity to clarify that a 
district court in this Circuit need not restrict its inquiry into 
litigation activity to any single jurisdiction. In cases like the 
one at hand, where counsel has made a habit of filing 
essentially identical claims in multiple jurisdictions, and has 
voluntarily dismissed those claims after their opposing party 
(and the judiciary) have incurred substantial costs, a district 
court may, in its discretion, give weight to such facts when 
considering terms of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). To hold 
otherwise would be to permit counsel to frivolously expose 
their adversaries to unnecessary litigation costs. We will not 
                                              
a repeated practice of bringing claims and then dismissing 
them with prejudice after inflicting substantial litigation costs 
on the opposing party and the judicial system, attorneys’ fees 
might be appropriate.”). 
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require district courts to wear blinders when exercising the 
broad discretion afforded them under Rule 41(a)(2). 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel argues in the alternative that 
if “evidence of other actions is somehow relevant to the District 
Court’s decision . . . . Plaintiffs’ counsel would direct the 
Court’s attention to the fact that Federal Signal has sought fees 
and costs in Philadelphia Common Pleas for improper 
dismissal and its motions were denied by the Court.” Carroll 
Reply Br. 9. As Plaintiffs’ counsel put it in his opening brief, 
“[l]ogically, if the Court accepted the evidence, proffered by 
Federal Signal of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s litigation strategy in 
other jurisdictions, it should have taken heed of the results of 
Federal Signal’s motions for fees and costs in those 
jurisdictions.” Carroll Br. 21. Perhaps so. But while it might be 
worthwhile in a particular case for a district court to consider 
whether other courts have found it appropriate to award fees 
and costs, a district court is not bound by the decisions of other 
state and federal trial courts throughout the country. After 
conducting two evidentiary hearings in order to determine the 
appropriateness of awarding attorneys’ fees and costs in this 
case, the District Court was free to exercise its discretion in 
deciding whether granting the request for fees and costs was 
appropriate. 
V. 
 Although attorneys’ fees and costs are typically not 
awarded when a matter is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice 
under Rule 41(a)(2), we conclude that such an award may be 
granted when exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. 
Exceptional circumstances include a litigant’s failure to 
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perform a meaningful pre-suit investigation, and a repeated 
practice of bringing claims and dismissing them with prejudice 
after inflicting substantial costs on the opposing party and the 
judicial system. As those exceptional circumstances were 
present in this case, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees and costs. The 
District Court’s judgment will be affirmed.   
